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IN THE UTAH STATE SUPREME COURT 
Travis E. Telford 
Petitioner/Appellant 
v. 
Utah Bd. Of Pardons 
Respondents/Appellee 
Case no. 20000807-SC 
Priority no. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Jurisdiction and nature of proceedings 
This is an appeal from the dismissal of petition filed in the Third 
District Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (i) since the appellant is 
serving a sentence from the first-degree felony. 
Statement of case 
On March 12, 1994 the body of Troy Weston was discovered in a 
ditch near Willard Bay, Box Elder County, Utah. Several days later the 
(1 ) 
police arrested the petitioner and charged him with Weston's murder, 
Brandon Dahlquist, the co-defendant in this case was also arrested and 
charged with the murder of Troy Weston. 
Both defendants were arraigned and tried on the charge of murder a 
First-degree felon, under § 76-5-203 (1995)U.C.A. Both defendants were 
subsequently found guilty by a jury and sentenced to a period of 5 years to 
life in the Utah State Prison. Both appealed their conviction. 
The court of appeals affirmed the petitioners conviction State v. 
Telford, 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah AP Ct 1997). The court of appeals 
granted the co-defendant a new trial in which he was subsequently 
aquatinted of the charge. 
On May 27,1998 the petitioner was issued the pre-hearing packet that 
contains all the information used by the Board of Pardons in the 
determination of a projected release date. In this packet was the 
recommendation of a 2000 re-hearing with a projected release date of March 
27,2001 which reflects the sentence and release guidelines set forth by the 
Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice of 84 months. Also 
included in this packet was the charge of contempt of court for refusing to 
(2 ) 
testify against the co-defendant at the new trial. On June 4, 1998 the 
petitioner was taken to his original parole grant hearing. In this hearing, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole hearing officer and victims parents 
acknowledged that the petitioner was not the actual killer of the victim, but 
by refusing to testify against the actual murder he had let the actual murder 
go free. The case was put under advisement to be determined be the full 
broad. In the subsequent staffing review it has determined that the petitioner 
received re-hearing in 2018, some 206 months beyond the guidelines. The 
Board of Pardons cited the refusal to testify at the co-defendants second trial 
as an aggravating factor. 
This matter was then submitted to the Third District Court under Rule 
65 B(d* of the U.R.C.P. It was summarily dismissed on August 30, 2000 
and is now being appealed. 
Reasons for Granting Petition 
Point One: 
The Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its 
scope of authority bv taking on the role of a Judicial sentencing 
entity which patently violates Article V Section I of the Utah 
States Constitution and Article HI Section I of the United States 
Constitution 
( 3 ) 
The framers of the United States Constitution set up three separate 
and distinct forms of government, the Executive, the Legislative, and the 
Judicial branches of government, They vested each of these three forms of 
government with certain powers. In the U.S. Constitution under Article III 
Section I the Judicial branch of government was first described in the 
formation of these three separate powers. The Judicial branch states the 
following. 
"The Judicial branch of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish, the Judges both of the 
Supreme and Inferior Courts. Shall hold their offices during 
good behavior, and shall, at stated time, receive for their 
services a compensation, which shall not diminish during their 
continuance in office. " (Id U.S. Constitution) 
In following in these footsteps the framers of the Utah State 
Constitution set up the same three separate branches of government. They 
described the duties of these branches of government and delegated their 
powers in Article VI for the legislative, Article W for the executive, and 
(4 ) 
Article VIII for the Judicial. The framers of the Utah State Constitution went 
a step further than the U.S. Constitution by including Article V Section I into 
the Utah State Constitution, [the separation of powers clause.] This 
difference was so that the core powers or functions of the three branches of 
government can only be utilized by a duly appointed officer of that division 
of government. This was done to prevent the accumulation of all of these 
powers into the hands of a few or many, which would be the ultimate 
definition of a tyranny. In Article VIII the Judicial Branch of government is 
defined in the Utah State Constitution, those who belong to the Judicial 
Branch are clearly identified therein. These people vested with the power of 
the Judiciary are the only people who can utilize the core Judicial Powers of 
issuing final orders or imposing sentence. This was stated succinctly by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. Ohms 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 
the Ohms court stated as follows: 
"Likewise a judge cannot appoint another person to enter final 
judgements and orders or impose sentence. While he or she can 
utilize referees, court commissioners, and other assistants for 
various purposes, those persons cannot exercise that Judges 
ultimate Judicial power for such if a non-delegable core judicial 
( 5 ) 
function. In Courts of record, it is the Judge who is selected by 
a precise constitutional procedure to exercise judicial power and 
it is the Judge, not other "Quasi-Judicial" officers, who is 
subject to the accountability provisions of the Utah State 
Constitution." (Id at 848-849) 
This was the determination by the Supreme Court when it revoked the power 
to impose sentence, final judgements, and orders on criminal misdemeanor 
matters in the State of Utah from court commissioners. As it said they are 
not an Article VIII Judge and cannot do so under Article V Section I of the 
Utah State Constitution. Therefore, clarifying that sentencing is a core 
Judicial function and cannot be practiced by anyone other that an Article 
Vm Judge. 
However this is not the case on felony criminal matters that are 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison, since Utah practices indeterminate 
sentencing. Under this sentence scheme, it becomes the Utah State Board of 
Pardons and Parole and not an Article VHI Judge who actually imposes the 
sentence of imprisonment beyond the court imposed minimum. For it is the 
Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole who applies the sentence and 
release guidelines, and is therefore issuing the actual sentence of 
( 6 ) 
imprisonment for the crime that was committed. This has previously been 
acknowledged by the Utah State Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the 
Following precedents of Foote v. Utah Bd of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991) the Foote court stated as follows: 
"However, under the Utah indeterminate sentencing system, the 
statute under which the defendant is convicted of for example a 
first degree felony, sets the time of imprisonment as a range, 
from 5 years to life. If the trial Judge sends the defendant to 
prison, the Judge does not determine the number of years a 
defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered 
discretion of the Board of Pardons which performs a function 
analogous to that of the trial Judge in jurisdiction that have a 
determinate sentencing scheme." (Id) 
See also Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons 870 P.2d 902,911-12 (Utah 
19930 
"To the extent that it is responsible for the application of the 
[Sentencing] guidelines. The Board function as a sentencing 
entity and decides the term of incarceration." 
( 7 ) 
Accord Preece v. House 848 P.2d 163 (Utah ct app 1993) cert granted 853 
P.2d 89 (Utah 1993): 
"That the decision made by the Board of Pardons at an original 
parole grant hearing as to the time to be served by a prison 
inmate is inherently a sentencing function" (ID) 
Therefore, it is clearly recognized by this States Supreme Court and 
also the State Court of Appeals, that the Board of Pardons and Parole, being 
a member of the executive branch of government set up under Article VII 
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, is exercising the core Judicial 
function of sentencing in the State of Utah. This is a direct violation of 
Article V Section I of the Utah State Constitution, the separation of powers 
clause. The reason for this unconstitutional delegation of power is the 
statute, which empowers the Utah Board of pardons and Parole to make this 
determination § 77-18-4 U.C.A.. which describes the indeterminate 
sentencing practice. 
At the District Court level of the action the State rebutted this 
argument with the case of Padilla v. Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 947 P.2d 
664 (Utah 197) where the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
( 8 ) 
"Therefore, while the courts have the power to sentence, the Board 
has been given the power to pardon and parole. These are two 
separate and distinct powers, neither of which invades the province of 
the other. Under our indeterminate sentencing scheme, a court must 
set an indeterminate sentence as provided by statute. By its very term, 
the "indeterminate" sentence shall continue until the maximum period 
expires unless the Board, in its desecration, terminates or commutes 
the punishment or pardons the offender." (Id at 669) 
The fact that the Board, in applying the sentence and release 
guidelines. Performs a function analogous to that of a Trial Judge in 
jurisdictions with a determinate sentencing scheme, as pointed out in the 
precedent of Foote, Preece. and Labrum. seems to have been set aside in 
issuing the decision of Padilla. 
It was the courts opinion that the Board of Pardons only exercises 
their constitutionally granted powers to pardon and parole. If this is true, that 
the Board is only practicing their constitutionally granted powers. Then the 
sentencing Judge has, in effect, sentenced the defendant to a maximum 
period of time allowable by statute. The court stated this fact in Padilla when 
it stated: 
( 9 ) 
"By its very term, the "indeterminate" sentence shall continue 
until the maximum period expires unless the Board, in its 
discretion, terminates or commutes the punishment or pardons 
the offender." (Id at 669) 
This practice, of issuing the maximum penalty in each and every case, 
violates the right, granted to all persons in the United States by the 8^ 
Amendment to the United States Constitution that protects citizens form 
cruel and unusual punishment, for as it has been stated by the United States 
Court of Appeals in the case of United States v.Barker. 771 F.2d 1363 
(1995): 
"By routinely entering the maximum sentence without 
differentiation among defendants, the District Court "failed to 
abide by the implied congressional mandate to frame the 
punishment to address the particular circumstances of the 
individual defendants." (Id at 1367) 
This does not happen in the State of Utah because all criminal defendants, 
on felonies, sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, are sentenced to the 
exact same sentence, with no merit given to the mitigating circumstances of 
level of their culpability, by the sentencing Judge. For he is mandated 
( 1 0 ) 
through the indeterminate sentencing scheme to issue a sentence that will 
run to the maximum statutorily prescribed time, as stated in Padilla. 
This practice of giving the maximum penalty in each and every case is 
a blatant violation of Article I Section 9 of the Utah State constitution, for 
not only does Article I Section 9 of the Utah State constitution guarantee the 
same privileges as the 8th Amendment it includes an [unnecessary rigor] 
clause that guarantees anyone in the Utah system of jurisprudence and it 
cannot be contended that it is not very harsh or severe to impose the 
maximum penalty without and consideration given to the mitigating factors 
surrounding the crime and the criminal or taking into account the level of 
culpability of the offender being sentenced" 
Therefore, the decision in Padilla violates both the 8th Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 of the Utah State 
Constitution, and renders the statute § 77-18-4 U.C.A. that defines the 
indeterminate sentencing practice in the State of Utah unconstitutional. The 
practice of giving a mechanistic application of a given sentence to a given 
category of crime should be stopped for it is unconstitutional. 
Point 2: 
( 1 1 ) 
The Utah Board of Pardons has exceeded the petitioners 
sentence and release guidelines bv adding 206 months to his 
sentence. 
The petitioner was found to be in contempt of court by an admonishment by 
the court during the October 1997 re-trial of the petitioners' co-defendant by 
the Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield. This admonishment was a result of the 
petitioners' invocation of his Fifth Amendment protections, in not giving 
testimony in his co-defendants second trial in which he was subsequently 
acquitted. The Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield stated that giving the 
petitioner a fine or sentence was fruitless so he was therefore going to write 
a letter to the Board of Pardons and Parole explaining the petitioners 
reluctance to testify. The Honorable Judge Hadfield did not do this though 
and there were never any formal charges filed against the petitioner. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole has subsequently used this contempt 
of court against the petitioner adversely against him in deciding his actual 
term of imprisonment. In doing this the Board of Pardons and Parole has 
taken on the roles of the Attorney General, the Article VIII Judge, the jury, 
and the executioner of sentence in this matter. This is in direct conflict with 
Article V Section I of the Utah State Constitution, the separation of powers 
(12) 
clause. Such a use of power by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole is 
plainly unconstitutional since, pursuant to Article VIP, only Judges, of 
courts of record, may enter judgements and impose sentence in court of 
record, since they are the only judicial officers constitutionally appointed to 
perform such functions. Yet the Board of Pardons in determining the 
petitioner actual term of imprisonment, re-sentenced the petitioner 206 
months over and above his recommended release of 84 months. The reason 
for exceeding the sentence and release guidelines stated by the Board of 
Pardons n their rational for decision was the following: 
"Court finding of contempt for refusal to testify at co-
defendants trial an aggravating factor." 
By the utilization of the invocation of the petitioners Fifth 
Amendment protections, he has been punished for doing what the law 
permits. This is clearly unconstitutional see : U.S. v. Nichols937 F.2d 1257 
(7th cir 199n:Blackledee v. Perry. 417 U.S. 21,40 l.Ed.2d 628, 94 Set 2094 
(1974); U.S. v. Guthrie. 789 F.2d 356 (5th cir 1986) (For the government to 
punish a person because he had done what the law plainly allows him to do 
is a due-process violation of the most basic sort) The holdings from the 
United States Supreme Court and other subsequent district courts makes it a 
( 1 3 ) 
violation of due process to punish the petitioner for not giving testimony by 
the invocation of his Constitution Rights. Their inherent rights in which 
cannot be surgically removed through Legislative statute or administrative 
rules are ones that extend into the construction of Magna Carta by Lord 
Coke. The phrase "Due process of law" apparently originated in our judicial 
parlance with Lord Coke who in construing the language of the Magna 
Carta, "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of life, liberty, 
or property but by the judgement of his peers or the law of the land." said 
that the "Law of the land" meant "due process of law", which definition is 
the language used in our constitution. Many attempts have been made to 
further define "due Process" but they all resolve in the thought that a party 
shall have his day in court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing 
evidence to establish his case or his defense, after which comes judgement 
upon the record thus made. Says the standard definition: It "hears before it 
condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgement only after trial." 
The term "Law of the land" embraces all legal and equitable rules, which 
define human rights and duties, and provides for their protection and 
enforcement as between the state and its citizen, and between man and man. 
And the "due process of law" includes the steps essential under such rules to 
( 1 4 ) 
deprive a person of life or liberty. It covers the means of law. Jenkins v. 
Ballantvne. Normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring judicial 
action, but "due process" is not necessarily judicial action. , 8Utah 245, 30 
P.760,16 L.RA 689 Normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring 
judicial action, but "due process" is not necessarily a judicial action. People 
v. Hasbrouck 11 Utah 291, 39P. 918: Ex parte Wall. 107 U.S. 265, 2 Sict 
569, 27 L.Ed 52. In proper cases the purposes of the law may be officiated 
by executive or administrative action. But all the methods and means 
provided for the protection and enforcement of human rights whether 
criminal, civil, or special proceedings have the same basic requirements, that 
no party can be affected by such action, until his legal rights have been 
subject of enquiry by a person or body that is authorized by law to determine 
such rights. In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due 
process are: (1) the existence of a competent person, body, or agency 
authorized bv law to determine the questions (2) Inquiry into the merits of 
the question bv such person, body or agency. (3) Notice to the person of the 
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry. (4) The right to be heard in person 
or bv counsel. (5) Fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses. (6) Judgement to be rendered upon the record. 
( 1 5 ) 
Here stopping at the threshold of the inquiry (1) the existence of a 
competent person, body, or agency [authorized by law] to determine the 
questions. It is absolutely clear that the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole 
does not have the authority to determine guilt or innocence of the contempt 
of court admonishment by the Judge. More so the petitioner has never been 
charged, tried, or convicted of contempt of court. Therefore, the board of 
Pardons cannot use this factor in deciding the petitioners' sentence and to 
exceed the sentence and release guidelines by 206 months. This action by a 
member of the executive branch of government is in conflict with the Utah 
State Constitution Article V Section L the separation of powers clause, since 
sentencing is a core judicial function, (see Ohms, supra). Members of the 
Executive Branch of government cannot exercise powers of the Judicial or 
the Legislative branch. This doctrine has been defined in State v. Gallion 
572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) where the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"In this case the prohibition of Section I, is directed to a person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to the 
"executive department." The constitution further specifies in 
Article VII, Section I, and the person of whom the executive 
department shall consist. Thus it is the "persons" charged with 
(16 ) 
the exercise of the powers belonging to executive department, 
who are prohibited from exercising, and functions appertaining 
to the Legislative and Judicial departments." (Id at 687) 
Conclusion 
It is clear that by the application of the United States Constitution and 
the Utah State Constitution which differs slightly adding a separation of 
powers clause, disallows the delegation of the sentencing authority to 
anyone other than a Article VIII Judge, for such is a core judicial function. 
More so, mis State has previously held in both the Utah Supreme Court and 
Utah Court of Appeals that the Board of Pardons and Parole is carrying out 
the sentencing function by applying the sentence and release guidelines in 
the State of Utah, which is a core judicial function. Since this State has 
included the separation of powers clause, § 77-18-4 U.C.A. cannot authorize 
the delegation of the sentencing power to the Board of Pardons. It is entirely 
in conflict with the whole purpose of not only the formation of the three 
powers of government, Judicial, Executive, and Legislative. It further makes 
the separation of powers clause imbedded in the Utah State Constitution 
meaningless. And, with the State arguing that criminal defendants are 
( 1 7 ) 
actually sentenced to the maximum period of time allowable by statute 
renders the cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor clauses 
meaningless. The indeterminate sentencing scheme now utilized cannot 
remain since everyone ever sentenced under it to date is serving an 
unconstitutional and therefore illegal sentence. 
The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole has been and continues to 
exercise a judicial function not delegated to their branch of government, the 
executive branch, This, as seen by precedent, and both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. Point two elaborated the 
inherent due process of both the court actions as well as the Board of 
Pardons actions. There occurrences have violated the most basic principles 
of jurisprudence, they cannot continue. The unconstitutionality of § 77-18-4 
U.C.A. Utah sentencing statute is apparent and the practice of the Board 
applying the sentence and release guidelines must be stopped. The Pre-
sentence Investigation Reports play the important role of determining the 
amount of time to be served. The AP&P investigators are the best persons to 
determine those issues. The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole takes the 
position that the recommendation of the pre-sentence report is only that, a 
recommendation, and they are not bound by it. How ever the sentencing 
(18) 
guidelines are not set to eliminate discretion but to bridle it. The purpose of 
the Sentencing guidelines is as follows. 
Purpose 
These sentencing and release guidelines represent a co-
operative effort, with imput by major components of the 
criminal justice system to make a unified statement of policy 
regarding the sentencing and release of criminal offenders. (1) 
The underlying philosophy of the guidelines is that criminal 
sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offence for which the offender is convicted Id Utah 
Sentencing Guidelines training Manual Pg2 
The Utah Board of Pardons is disregarding the sentencing guidelines 
and they continue to be unbridled at their determination. It now seems to be 
a completely unauthorized abuse of their authority since by law and Utah 
constitution they simply do not have the authority to make these 
determinations and neither the Legislature nor the sentencing Judge can 
delegate it. 
(19) 
The petitioner should be issued a determinate sentence that complies 
with the sentence and release guidelines that reflect his culpability and the 
Court should order that the Board of Pardons have to discontinue the 
practice of applying the sentence and release guidelines. If the only way that 
this can be accomplished is to rule § 77-18-4 U.C.A. unconstitutional and a 
determinate sentencing system that is constitutional adopted then this should 
be done. 
Respectfully submitted on this day of 2000 
Travis E.Telford #239999 
Attorney pro se 
County of Salt Lake ) 
)ss 
State of Utah ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this day of 2000 
Notary Public 
(20) 
Exhibit A 
Judgement and Commitment order 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS EDWARD TELFORD/ 
Defendant. 
64rZg^l 
On the 30th day of May, 1995, appeared Jon J. Bunderson 
Box Elder County Attorney representing the State of Utah/ and the 
defendant appeared in person and represented by counsel/ Michael 
D, Bouwhuis. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted by 
his plea of guilty X a jury the Court 
of the offense (s) of: MURDER/ A FELONY THE 1ST DEGREE as charged; 
and the Court having asked the defendant whether he has anything 
to say why Judgment should not be pronounced/ and no sufficient 
cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court/ 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and 
convicted, and/ 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby 
committed to the Utah State Prison and the Sheriff of Box Elder 
County is directed to take him into custody and deliver him to 
JUDGMENT AND C 
Case No. 941000 
the Warden of the Utah State Prison to serve a term of Not less 
than 5 years nor more than life with a consecutive enhancement of 
not less than one nor more than five years for use of a firearm. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution in 
the amount of $23,072.00 ($6500.00 of that is joint and several 
liability with the co-defendant). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested by the Clerk of the Court and that a 
certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that the copy serve as the Commitment of 
the defendant and as the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining and delivering said defendant. 
DATED this "^ Sf- day of Mfiu 19*25 . 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST: 
CLERK, FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
By Deputy Clerk 
2 
Exhibit B 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals 
State of Utah v Travis Telford 
320 Vt. Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App ct. 1997) 
differently from the Federal constitution. We therefore limit 
our analysis to the Federal Constitution. £££ State vl Wood. 868 
P.2d 70, 90 n.4 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant 
Fourth Ameffitoe, 
outgoing 
deniedf 
that fax 
actions' 
underlying 
correction^© 
1033, 103%; 
ANALYSIS 
.I-c- Admissibility of Letters 
lat , because ja i l off ic ials^viplated h i s 
tthen they inspected and- copied'ihis , 
" """ '•" r^ the t r i a l c d u r j ^ ^ n ^ a s i y ^ i ^ : |the l e t t ers . J t t j i n * 
i ^ F i r s t Americby||t 
__;ourt • s" lega l^ clfncDL 
iSra^Sfifi State v. McSratfcHfr3aft*& 2d 
&MmmMmgim& 
£9M 
mdelr 
In Stroll ££&&£&, 251 U.S. 15,™ 40 S.; Ct. 50 (1919), , t h ^ ^ ^ e M s t a t e & - Supreme Court held that^the defendant's 
Fourth Ame^ dxnerPf right's were not violated by th'e^seTzure and 
prosecutipn^s^jgse^of l e t t e r s the defendant had written in j a i l . 
^ . v - — a t 52-53? see a l so Hudson v. Palmerr 468 U.SZf^l^gmmfOA^S. Ct. 3194, 3205 (1984)^("TTJhe Fourth 
Amendment^has^iojapplicability to a prison c e l l .~w)£|3; The Supreme 
Court emphasiTe^hatlthe* o f f i c i a l s were" f oll6\irigl[the\ 
established|p^rfc3^6f'~the prison when they inspectedTthe l e t t e r s . 
Later, the SSA SlU±ia?;2Sl^S/-at 21, 40 S, Ct. at 52-53/ 
Supreme Courl^ theld that, under the First Amendmentsprison 
regulations restricting correspondence Mmust further an important 
or substantial government interest•• and be no greater than is 
necessary to protect the interest. Procunier v. Martinezf 416 
U.S. 396, 413^94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds. Thofnburah v, Abbott. 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S. Ct. 
1874, 1882 (1989).~ Since Martinez, courts have limited Stroud's 
Fourth Amendment holding to cases in which prison officials have 
seized and inspected outgoing, nonprivileged letters Min the 
exercise of legitimate government interests.11 United states v. 
Whalen, 940_F.2d„1027,_1035 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing cases 
limiting Stroud)• 
Here, the jail policy governing outgoing mail provides that 
mail will be winspected and scanned11 before delivery outside the 
jail. Defendant concedes that he was on notice of this policy. 
We conclude that the policy is narrowly tailored and serves 
important-government interests by promoting discipline and 
preventing criminal acts, &&£ People v. Whalin, 885 P.2d 293, 
296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); see also Whalen. 940 F.2d at 1035 
(n[I3t is well established that prisons have sound reasons for 
reading the^oujtgoing mail of their inmates*w) • Iiffaddition, 
H[o]nce prison.,officials have a right to examine^suclf-messages, 
no rule requires them to close their eyes to what: they discover 
therein." State v. Jeffprs, 661 P.2d 1105, 1115-(Ariz. 19S3)• 
Therefore, because jail officials did not violatejrdef endant fj5 
Fourth Amendment rights by inspecting and copyingThis-. 
nonpriviieged, outgoing mail, the trial court properly denied 
defendantIs^mojtionato suppress the letters. ^^^^^ 
5* &M3Z 
note 
Because 
:Defendani 
Turnir^t^^^^ndant f s First Amendment argfl|| 
thafe^jai^^^Mora^^did not deprive defendarir^ 
c o ^ f f l p m d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ j ^ c e n s o r s h i p ^ o r — — - -
^ e t t e ^ ^ ^ p g f f l ^ M B S ^ L 2 d at 296^
 w ^ 
W^^^^^f^j^^^d^ ail^of f iciia 
^^^^^ent^rightsi^^ 
[IjL Severance 
cwfESids-thaT tfie^trial^coifft^rPpi'c^l^^ehied 
h ^ g ^ t i o n ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ h c trial. He argues that^yggiefense, which 
erqdMsizea ^^^^^efendant had pulled the trigge^^nd forced 
dI*f^aant^€o^o^a*i1if^i6re ammunition, was 3 rreccShci^a'ble with the 
arguments of codefendant, who raised an alibi defense. Defendant 
f J ^ ^ P ^ r J ^ I ^ S * ^ e w a s Prejudiced by the-tri^fecpurt's denial 
fipprovides that when a^defe^^^^^^-ejudiced 
«,rs^ *«-*.v,*v.« w^„^ *^-.*«t «„ juiticej*remiires%" Utah 
Cd^Ann^fst7,7|L8a-l(4)(a) (1995). In interpretingjthis 
provision",'~thefutah Supreme Court has held that' "(dfoubts 
concerning prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in 
favor of a" defendant." State v. Collins. 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 
1980). The supreme court has further stated that, although trial 
courts "appear^.to be reluctant to grant severance,'* that 
reluctance-"is^ill-advised and in the long run'risks, greater 
expenditure of.judicial resources.M State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 
696, 898 (Utah 1986). Thus, if "joint defendants have defenses 
that appear to be inconsistent with or to obstruct or impede each 
other," trial courts must "carefully examine" severance reguests 
and "grant severance when there is any doubt-as~ to-prejudice." 
Defendant argues that his defense was antagonistic and 
irreconcilable with that of codefendant. "Antagonistic defenses 
alohelare not sufficient to require a separate trial." State V, 
itelarde. ,734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986). Rather, severance is 
required only if :'*the defenses conflict to the point of being 
Irreconcilable and'mutually exclusive." IiL. At trial, defendant 
sfaued that codefendant shot Weston and ordered defendant to 
.wzgflSXag^Ji:59 WmfJJtXW. .r -irr:cx:foF?lPPEALs.sa.,,,^p^ 
--.^ v«.^4iu£S^-.<«. J® QO? 
r e t r i e v e additional ammunition from the Blazer , codefendant, 
however, denied that he was at the scene when t h e shooting 
occurred. Thus, the defenses were mutually e x c l u s i v e : the jury 
had t o r e j e c t one defense t o b e l i e v e the o ther . See s i l v a v. 
££&£&;-" 933 S*W.2d 715, 719 (Tex. App. 1996)^ ; Under these 
circumstances/ we agree with defendant that^the t r i a l court erred 
i i u r e f u s i n g t o sever the t r i a l . _,^J~ 
Respite|the^error, however, we 
^ e s u l t f f o r defendant would . h a W g ^ 
severed ^the-1 
I ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ i f a nore 
asdnafcly. 1 iXely 
L f i ^ t o i i i s , 748 
$lM»gg :ehdarit 
^ P f e W a ^ ^ r e c l u d e d ; f r < S ^ u ^ ^ p ^ ^ ® ^ ^ ^ j j f t g ^ » 
JafScnfTift^violation of i^the: StxtK^aendmeni^g See i d . 
kWlS9p9^(addressing; raerxts of argument i t h a t « r e f u ^ ^ 1 : o sever 
" " " ed*infcSi3ctli;:A»ehd»ent error )^ s e e ^ a l ^ H e r d g ^ K i n c h e l oe
 f 
iivel 
resi 
8o6%^2<3 1526; 1529 (9th Cir. 1986)! (statinglthat,denial of 
severance" may result in violation of confrontation rights). 
•>**,?- I n particular, defendant contends that, had the trial court 
severed the trial, his entire statement identifying,.codefendant 
asXthe shooter would have been admissible through cross-
elwninationi of Detective Hansen. We have reviewed the unredacted 
s^a^^^ntfF however, and conclude thlit^Tth^blaghi the ^statement 
cjea^yj-implicates codefendant as the shooterf-xt-also portrays 
d^eh^nt^hiinself as an active participant^incathe murder*4 In 
Contrast/.the unredacted statement contains rib exculpatory 
evidence that might reasonably have led:the jury, to either acquit 
defendant or?find him guilty,of a lesser included offense/ 
rherefore; w4 conclude that any constitutional error in excluding 
tlie redacted portions was harmless. See Delaware v. Van Arsdallf 
475 U.S. 673; 684, 106 S. Ct, 1431/ 1438 (1986) (concluding that 
confrontation clause error is subject to harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard). 
4; The trial court commented on the unredacted statement as 
follows: 
[I]f the statement came in with no 
redactions, it is in essence a confession 
anyway. If the jury finds, as a matter of 
fact, that defendant Telford went to the 
vehicle, got more ammunition, brought the 
clip~ back so that the shooting, or execution 
at that.point, could Jae completed, then he 
hasv-in effect confessed to being part and 1 
parcel of that crime. 
Defendants counsel agreed with this characterization, but argued 
that th* jury might instead use the unredacted statement to 
convir defendant of a lesser included off 
Defendant further argues that,_if tried separately, he would 
have been allowed to cross-e*xamine Detective Hansen about other 
exculpatory statements,5 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"we will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of * evidence appears of 
record.11 State v. Rammelr 721^P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986); fififi 
flJLfiQ Utah R. Evid, 103 (a) (2JJ THere, the record does not reflect 
that defendant informed the ^trial. court that further cross-
examination of Detective Hanse«1[might reveal other exculpatory 
statements giv^n by defenda^.^!£herefore# the "substance" of $fiis particular evidence^wa^ to the court," nor 
Msjitlrfapparent from ^ w|c^w^^^^^S^^h"ich questions were^f > 
^ ^ M g t a h > . ^idm^^^^^^mmvl ftrg^lleg, 9 2 1 ^ 
ft2^^g^^45^;(Utah""19^^^^^^^^^^^^^^>roof to showjvhat 
^iSence^oul1a-be^addu^^5^B^^5^^^^^^&ot" address thelB|| 
mf^^S^ft^^^G a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ , 921 P.2d at 445? 
The trial court properly denied defendants motion to 
suppress the letters he wrot» in-jail. Although the trial court 
erred in refusing to seyer^ the^  trial, ^ that error, as well as any 
resulting constitutional error*f^ was* harmless• We therefore 
cannot say that, had the^tri^l^court severed the trial, defendant 
5. In support of this contention, defendant points to the 
comments of counsel for codefendant at a preliminary hearing; 
I figure we have 14 statements that this 
defendant (TelfordJ has made. The first one 
goes from I wasnft there, but I think Brandon 
did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled 
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and 
made me drag the body. He pointed the gun at 
me and made me load it again so we could pump 
more bullets into the body* • . . 
• • • • 
It is clear Mr* Telford is saying you made me 
do it and you pointed a gun at me. That*s 
what Mr. Telford's defense will be. 
would have been reasonably likely to obtain a more favorable 
result• 
Defendants conviction is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
MichUetfyJ. Wilkins, 
Asspcxate Presiding Judge 
Gregory &c Orme, Judge 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant Travis Telford was convicted of murder, a fiist-
degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995). He appeals 
his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied 
his motion to suppress certain letters he wrote in jail. He also 
argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to 
sever the trial* We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 12, 1994, the body of Troy Weston was discovered in 
a ditch near Willard Bay, Several days later, the police 
arrested defendant and charged him with Weston's murder. Brandon 
Dahlquist, the codefendant in this case, was also arrested and 
charged with the murder. 
While defendant was incarcerated on the murder cnarge, he 
wrote several letters about the murder. After insp^tmg the 
letters pursuant to jail policy, jail officials maJ; copies of 
some of the ~rs and sent the copies to the co* attorney. 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the letters, 
arguing that, by inspecting and copying the letters, jail 
officials had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. 
The trial court denied the motion, and, at trial, excerpts from 
three of defendant's letters were read to the jury* 
Soon after defendant's arrest, Detective David Hansen 
escorted defendant to a police station in another city to 
question him about an unrelated matter. On the way back to the 
jail, defendant began talking to the detective about Weston's 
murder• The detective's report of. defendant's statement is set 
forth, in relevant part, below: 
Travis{,] without being asked(,] just started 
talking about the homicide of Troy Weston. 
He said that Troy had inquired about buying a 
gun from [codefendant] Brandon because he had 
some people that wanted to hurt him. So he 
said that he and Brandon went and picked up 
Troy Weston at his house and headed out to 
Willard to show him the gun. 
He said that when he, Brandon Dahlquist, and 
Troy arrived out in Willard, Brandon pulled 
out a small automatic «22 cal. handgun. He 
said that they had parked on the side of the 
road to shoot. They then got out and went 
over to shoot the gun and Troy asked how did 
it work. 
Travis said that when Troy asked if it 
worked, Brandon then said, "I'll show you how 
it works." He then said that Brandon then 
pointed the gun at Troy and shot him in the 
shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said 
what are you doing? He then said Brandon 
then shot him again, this time twice in the 
back because Troy then had shifted sideways. 
He then said that Troy continued to yell for 
him to stop it. He then said one of the 
bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he 
quit moving and just dropped to the ground. 
Brandon then shot him again twice more in the 
front and the gun jammed. Brandon then tcld 
Travis to go to the Blazer and get another 
clip so Travis ran to the Blazer and got 
another clip. 
He the\ said when he got back from the 
Bias- ^randon loaded the new clip and 
08/26/97 THU 11:57 FAX 801 578 3999 UT CT OF APPEALS (gjOO* 
placed the gun under Troy's chin and pulled 
the trigger one last time. He then said Troy 
did not move anymore and Brandon told him to 
drag the body about 3 0 feet to a ditch. He 
then said they got back in the Blazer and 
sped back to Ogden. 
Over the objections of both defendants, the trial court 
allowed Detective Hansen to read a redacted version of 
defendant's statement to the jury. To protect codefendantfs 
confrontation rights, the trial court had ordered that the 
statement be redacted to omit any reference to Dahlquist.1 
1. The redacted statement# as read to the jury, appears in the 
transcript, in relevant part, as follows: 
Travis, without being asked, started to 
talk about the homicide of Troy Weston. He 
said that Troy had inquired about buying a 
gun because he had some people who wanted to 
hurt him. He said he went and picked up Troy 
Weston at his house and headed out to Willard 
to show him the gun. 
He said that when he and Troy arrived 
out in Willard out came a small automatic .22 
caliber handgun. He said that they had 
parked on the side of the road to shoot. 
They then got out and went over to shoot the 
gun and Troy asked how did it work- Travis 
said that when Troy asked if it worked, he 
was shot in the shoulder. He said Troy 
screamed and said what are you doing- Troy 
then was shot again. This time twice in the 
back, because Troy's body had then shifted 
sideways. 
He then said Troy continued to yell to 
stop it. He then said that one of the 
bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he 
quit moving and just dropped to the ground* 
Troy was then shot again twice more in the 
front and the gun jammed. He said it either 
jammed or ran out of ammunition- Travis vent 
back to the Blazer and got another clip. 
When he got back to the Blazer the new clip 
was loaded and the gun was placed under 
Troy's chin and the trigger pulled one last 
time. He then said Troy did not move any 
more and he dragged the body about 30 feet tc 
the dit^1 He then got back to the Blazer 
(o~ led. . .) 
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Defendant had argued that admission of the redacted statement 
would force him to testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, because it falsely implied that he had pulled the 
trigger- Although the redacted statement was admitted into 
evidence, defendant never testified. 
Defendant also argued that, under his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses, he should be permitted to ask Detective 
Hansen on cross-examination whether the statement, as read to the 
jury, was a complete representation of what defendant had told 
him. Defendant contended that the- redacted portions of his 
statement are exculpatory andf that further cross-examination of 
the detective might reveal additional exculpatory evidence. The 
trial court d-Ld not allow defendant to ask Detective Hansen about 
any redacted matters or to refer to codefendant in any way. 
During a pretrial hearing, and again at trial, defendant 
requested that he and codefendant be tried separately. The trial 
court, however, refused to sever the trial. The jury convicted 
both defendants of murder.2 
On appeal, defendant argues that jail officials violated his 
First and Fourth Amendment rights by inspecting and copying the 
letters he wrote in jail. He therefore contends that the trial 
court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the letters. He 
also argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to 
sever the trial and that he was prejudiced by the trial court %& 
refusal to sever. As evidence of prejudice, he argues that the 
trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by precluding him 
from fully cross-examining Detective Hans€>n.3 
Defendant cites analogous provisions of the Utah 
Constitution to support his arguments. He fails, however, to 
explain how the Utah Constitution should be interpreted 
1. (..•continued) 
and sped back to ogden. 
(Quotation marks omitted,) 
2. This court reversed codefendant1 s conviction on the ground 
that his Miranda rights were violated during police 
interrogation. fi£S State v, Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862
 f 868 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) • 
3. Defendant also contends that the trial court violated his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We declir. j to 
address defendants F''"* * Amendment argument, however, bee- * he 
has failed to cite ar- ^hority to support his contentior- ;e£ 
fi+^frfl v- Bishop. 75? '19, 450 (Utah 1988). 
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1 MR. BUNDERSON: At this point, if it's agreeable with 
2 the court, I'd like to call Travis Telford to the stand. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 TRAVIS TELFORD, 
5 called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell the 
6 truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
7 MR. BUNDERSON: Do I have permission to proceed with 
8 him as a hostile witness? 
9 MR. SNIDER: At this point I don't know if there's a 
10 foundation to do so. 
11 THE COURT: I'll take judicial notice of the fact that 
12 Mr. Bunderson was the prosecutor that obtained a conviction 
13 on this defendant, which, in the court's view, would 
14 suffice for a hostile witness. 
15 MR. BUNDERSON: As I told the jury, I'm not on his 
16 Christmas card list. 
17 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
19 Q. Your name is Travis Telford, is that correct? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. You are a co-defendant in this matter, is that 
22 correct, or you were a co-defendant in this matter? 
23 A. I'm going to take the Fifth on everything. 
24 Q. Have you previously been convicted of the murder 
25 of Troy Weston occurring on March 12th, 1994? 
i f A. I'm taking the Fifth on everything, Mr. 
2 Bunderson. I've got pending legal action. Therefore, I 
3 can't answer any of your questions, because it might be 
4 held against me in my trial. 
5 Q. Describe your pending legal action? 
6 A. Habeus corpus. I have one year to file my 
7 habeus. 
8 Q. Is there any direct --
9 A. I'm in the process of filing it right now. 
10 Q. Who is? 
11 A. I am. I have to do it myself because I'm 
12 indigent. 
13 Q. But it is a habeus petition? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Are you planning to file that in state court? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. But your direct appeals are all concluded, 
18 is that correct? 
19 A. Yes, because I wasn't informed by the lawyer that 
20 you appointed me that I had 30 days to refile on my last 
21 appeal denied. 
22 Q. I didn't appoint him, please understand that. 
23 The State did, or the judge did. Anyway, you understand 
24 that you appealed your conviction and the conviction was 
25 upheld and the remittitur has come back to this court, is 
1 
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that your understanding? 
MS. BRIDGESS: May I have a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Mr. Telford, this is Attorney Candace 
Bridgess. She's a public defender that works here. 
MR. TELFORD: Yes. I spoke to her downstairs. 
MS. BRIDGESS: We did speak downstairs. I need to put 
on the record that I did explain to Mr. Telford that prior 
to me passing the Bar that I worked for Mr. Snider as a law 
clerk and I assisted him on the Brandon Dahlquist case. He 
understands that and I believe will waive any conflict that 
I might have. 
MR. TELFORD: Yeah. I'm just pleading the Fifth and 
not saying nothing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Telford, because there are no pending 
criminal charges against you, you do not at this point have 
the right to appointed counsel. I'm not going to formally 
appoint her. We're making her available for you to consult 
with her as a convenience or courtesy as you may choose. 
MR. TELFORD: Yeah. 
THE COURT: But you aren't entitled to appointed 
counsel because right now you are not charged with 
anything. 
MR. TELFORD: I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you want to visit with her for a moment 
before going any further? 
1 MR. TELFORD: Yeah. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Just visit right there. 
3 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Bunderson, you may proceed. 
5 MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. 
6 Q. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) Mr. Telford, at this point 
7 I'm just trying to establish the current status of your 
8 legal proceedings. Is there anything pending other than a 
9 potential habeus writ? 
10 A. Under Rule 35 I was -- I had the right to be 
11 informed by my attorney as to having a rehearing on the 
12 denial of my appeal. I was not informed about that, so I 
13 therefore am requesting to file my habeus. 
14 Q. I understand that. My question is, is there 
15 anything pending to your knowledge other than the habeus 
16 petition? 
17 A. I don't know. You got any other charges on me 
18 now? 
19 Q. No, not other than what we've already done. 
20 A. Nothing that I know of, then. 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. I think the record would 
22 reflect, Your Honor, that the remittitur was sent back and 
23 I believe the status of the law is that any defendant, 
24 within certain time frames, always has rights -- the right 
25 to file a habeus writ; but as far as direct appeals are 
1 concerned, I believe his direct appeals are fully 
2 concluded. 
3 THE COURT: It's the court's understanding from 
4 visiting with counsel, and Mr. Snider, correct me if I'm 
5 wrong, but I believe you each have reviewed Mr. Telford's 
6 I criminal file and are satisfied that the time for any 
7 appeals on the criminal conviction have long since expired, 
8 is that correct? 
9 MR. SNIDER: That is correct, Judge. 
10 MR. BUNDERSON: That's my understanding also. 
11 MS. BRIDGESS: As of last week, when I spoke with the 
12 clerk of the Supreme Court, that is also my understanding. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
14 Q. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) Mr. Telford, if the court 
15 informs you that you do not have a Fifth Amendment 
16 privilege --
17 A. Then I get contempt. So what? 
18 Q. So your position --
19 A. The place I live at I cannot testify. If I 
20 testify it puts my life in danger. I'm not going to say 
21 anything. I'm just going to sit here and do nothing. 
22 Q. All right. 
23 A. You ain't going to get no answers. 
24 Q. I'm getting some talking at this point. Now, let 
25 me ask you this. If I were to ask you anything about your 
1 j relationship with Dahlquist and what happened with Mr. 
2 Weston, you would refuse to say anything? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. If I ask you if you wrote a particular letter and 
5 showed you a copy of that letter, would you confirm if you 
6 had indeed written the letter? 
7 A. I won't answer no questions. That would be a 
8 question and I won't answer any questions. 
9 Q. If I were to ask you whether you had given any 
10 statements to police officers involved in this matter, are 
11 you going to just not respond to me? 
12 A. No response. 
13 Q. All right. Particularly a statement you gave to 
14 a Detective Hansen, if I asked you about that on a 
15 particular date, are you just going to say no response? 
16 A. I might use a few expletives to describe the guy. 
17 I'm not going to answer anything, no. 
18 Q. You are not willing to discuss what you talked 
19 with him about? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Would the same apply to statements that were 
22 given to Detectives Ward and Summerill? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. Okay. And if the judge were to hold you in 
25 contempt for your failure to answer questions, your 
1 response is that so what, what can you do to me? 
2 A. Do you want them concurrent or consecutive with a 
3 five to life? 
4 MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. I believe that would establish 
5 the situation, Your Honor. I think that puts us at this 
6 point of allowing us to establish that his prior statements 
7 are reliable and that we could use those. 
8 THE COURT: Before we address that issue, Mr. Telford, 
9 let me advise you of a couple of things for the record. I 
10 think I understand full well what you're saying. You 
11 mentioned the place where you live and I understand where 
12 that is. 
13 MR. TELFORD: I've already gotten in a few fights down 
14 there over this whole matter. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You are in the custody of the 
16 Department of Corrections. This court at this point 
17 doesnft have any control over you. 
18 MR. TELFORD: I understand that. 
19 THE COURT: However, in a serious trial such as this 
20 one, the court has an interest in getting at the truth of 
21 what occurred. Because there are no pending criminal 
22 charges against you, you no longer have a Fifth Amendment 
23 right against self-incrimination. That right does not 
24 apply to you at this time. 
25 I am ordering you to respond to Mr. Bunderson's 
1 questions. Now# if you refuse, I will hold you in 
2 contempt. I understand that you are of the opinion that I 
3 don't pose near as much a threat to you as perhaps some 
4 other individuals. 
5 MR. TELFORD: Yeah, the people I live with. 
6 THE COURT: On the other hand, you need to understand 
7 that I take these proceedings very seriously. If you 
8 refuse and I hold you in contempt, it is my intention that 
9 I I will write to the Board of Pardons and indicate to them 
10 your refusal to follow my order and your contempt. Now, I 
11 don't know what they will do with it, but you understand 
12 J that your fate is in their hands? 
13 MR. TELFORD: Yeah. 
14 THE COURT: If you get out --
15 MR. TELFORD: I understand. Whether I testify or not, 
16 it ain't going to affect the Board one bit. They might 
17 hold it against me if I don't. It won't help if I do. 
18 THE COURT: I don't know whether it will or not. I'm 
19 telling you that I will send them a letter and indicate 
20 your refusal to follow a lawful court order. 
21 MR. TELFORD: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
23 MR. TELFORD: Yeah. 
24 THE COURT: Do you want to visit with Ms. Bridgess 
25 anymore before we go on? 
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MR. TELFORD: No. 
THE COURT: If you do, I'll allow it. 
MR. TELFORD: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Bunderson. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, at this point I think 
we've established Mr. Telford's attitude and it doesn't 
appear that we'll get anything out of him in the form of 
testimony either now, here, or in front of the jury. To 
the extent it might be necessary, I'd like to ask the court 
to keep him in one of the local jails for a few more days, 
then have him go back to the prison. 
MR. TELFORD: You ain't going to get no answers from 
me. You might as well send me home so my stuff isn't 
taken. It's not like I live with a high class of people. 
MR. BUNDERSON: If you want to testify we can put you 
on tomorrow. 
MR. TELFORD: No, I'm not going to testify. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I'd ask the court to do that. I don't 
know that he needs to be in here for any of the arguments. 
MR. TELFORD: Send me home. 
THE COURT: Mr. Telford, I'll give you one last 
opportunity. Are you going to follow my order and respond 
to the questions that are asked? 
MR. TELFORD: I'm going to have to decline that, Your 
Honor. 
1 THE COURT: All right. The court formally holds this 
2 defendant in contempt. The sanction I will impose under 
3 the circumstances is that I intend to write a letter to the 
4 Board of Pardons and explain to them these proceedings and 
5 the defendant's refusal to comply with the court's order. 
6 Beyond that it is up to them if they do anything or not. 
7 MR. TELFORD: All right. Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I will excuse you at this time. 
9 MR. SNIDER: Before you do I would like to ask some 
10 questions. 
11 THE COURT: All right. If he's refusing to answer 
12 questions I'm not sure how far you can get. 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. SNIDER: 
15 Q. You and I spoke in the prison? 
16 A. Yeah. About two weeks ago. 
17 Q. And before you and I talked -- well, Ted Selick 
18 was there? 
19 A. Yes. It was at the Oquirrhs. 
20 Q. Okay. And before you and I spoke at the 
21 Oquirrhs, Ted and you spoke at the Oquirrhs, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 THE COURT: For the record, can you clarify who Ted 
24 Selick is? 
25 MR. SNIDER: A paralegal that works for me on this 
1 case. 
2 Q. (3Y MR. SNIDER) Ted identified himself as a 
3 paralegal working for me on this case? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 | Q. A nice guy? 
6 J A. Yes. 
7 Q. Kind of the same hair line as yours? 
8 A. Yes. But he doesnft do it willingly. 
9 Q. Okay. You made a lot of statements to the cops 
10 when they arrested you and wrote a bunch of letters and 
11 stuff, correct? 
12 A. I have no response. 
13 Q. Okay. It would be fair to say that if any of 
14 them were called, they would testify you talked to them, 
15 correct? 
16 A. Yeah; but not necessarily the truth. 
17 Q. Okay. That's my question. Did you tell the cops 
18 the truth or were you jacking them around? 
19 A. I told them, when they interviewed me, I said if 
20 Ifm lying, so what. 
21 MR. SNIDER: Thank you. No other questions. 
22 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Bunderson? 
23 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
25 Q. At what point did you tell them the truth? 
1 A. I haven't told nobody nothing except a bunch of 
2 lies. 
3 Q. You told Detective Ward and Detective Summerill 
4 different stories on at least two different occasions, is 
5 that right? 
6 A, I don't know, 
7 Q. And were those --
8 A. It's been a long time ago. I can't recollect. 
9 Q. Were those true? 
10 A. I don't know. I can't recollect. 
11 Q. Were any of the untruths for the purpose of 
12 avoiding criminal liability or responsibility? In other 
13 words, saying like I didn't do it? 
14 A. I'm not going to answer that question. 
15 MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: The witness is excused at this time. I'll 
17 direct that he be held here in the local facility until 
18 such time as it's determined that he will not possibly be 
19 needed. 
20 MS. BRIDGESS: May I approach for a moment? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 (Discussion at the bench, not reported.) 
23 THE COURT: At this time the court will excuse 
24 attorney Candace Bridgess. Go ahead, counsel. 
25 (Trial continued, not transcribed.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 j STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
3 | COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
4 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the jury trial proceed-
5 ings were transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified 
6 Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
7 Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah. 
8 That a full, true and correct transcription of 
9 Mr. Travis Telford's examination at trial is set forth in 
10 the pages numbered 2 to 14, inclusive. 
11 I further certify that the original transcript 
12 was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box 
13 Elder County, Brigham City, Utah. 
14 I also certify that I am not associated with any 
15 of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
16 in the event thereof. 
17 Witness my hand and Notarial Seal this 1st day 
18 of June, 1998. 
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Board of Pardons hearing worksheet 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
05/26/98 12:00 PM KLR Page: 3 
Hearing Worksheet 
OBSCIS: 00082670 NAME: TELFORD, TRAVIS EDWARD USP: 23999 
OBSCIS: 00082670 USP: 23999 HEARING DATE: 06/04/1998TIME SERVED: 50 
TOTAL RESTITUTION: 23072.00 TOTAL FINES: 0.00 
EARLIEST COMMITMENT: TOTAL CREDIT DAYS: 425 
COMPUTATION DATE: 03/31/1994 FINAL EXPIRATION DATE: LIFE 
GUIDELINE MONTHS: 84 GUIDELINE PAROLE DATE: 03/27/2001 
RISK SCORE 8 Moderate 
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Letter from hearing officer Maarice Escobar 
Michael O. Lea vi t t 
Governor 
Michael R. Sibbett 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
Curt is L. G a r n e r 
Cheryl Hansen 
Keith N. Hamilton 
Members 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
448 East 6400 South-Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Tel (801) 261-6464 
Fax (801) 261-6481 
August 11, 1999 
Travis E Telford USP# 23999 
Utah State Prison U4- 510 
Draper, Utah 84020 
RE-Travis Telford 
USP# 23999 
Dear Mr. Telford: 
The Board of Pardons received your correspondence and it has been 
forwarded to me for a response. I have searched our records and find no 
documentation of you having asked your present questions of the Board before, as 
stated in your letter to Chief Justice Richard Howe. 
A 5 to Life sentence, in the state of Utah' indeterminate sentencing system, means 
you may serve a minimum of five years which may also be for life, in other words you 
will not expirate your sentence and the Board retains jurisdiction over your case for 
life. The Board of Pardons may grant a termination of sentence or it may grant a 
parole date or it may choose to keep you in prison for the rest of your natural life. 
Regarding your question of concurrent or consecutive sentences, you have only one 
sentence, therefore neither apply in your case. It only applies when there are more 
than one and if a sentence is concurrent to another, it means both times are to be 
served at the same time. If a sentence is consecutive to another, it means one 
sentence has to be served before the other can begin. In this case (consecutive), the 
sum of all sentences can not exceed 30 years, normally for offenses of a lesser 
degree that in your case. 
The Board received another letter from you requesting explanation to the following 
issues: Regarding the check marks in the rational for decision form, they are self 
explanatory, where there is aggravation a check mark is done and where there is no 
mitigation no check mark is done and viceversa. 
You ask "how the defiance of authority was determined?". Even though the court 
understood your reservations of testifying against your co-defendant it found you 
guilty of Contempt for your refused. At your Original Hearing, you told the Board 
member "I should have testified, and it's something I should have done, but I can't 
change something I have already done, I just have to deal with the problems that I've 
caused and what's happened". The Board member told you the Board was going to 
factor your unwilligness and reticence on your part, at that point in time,into their 
decision with regard to you and your sentence overall. 
Regarding your question of "what a staffing review entails". That is when your case 
was reviewed by the full Board after your Original Hearing and a decision was made 
regarding your case. You were told by the Board Member at your Original Hearing, 
he was going to present your case to them for review and decision. 
The information used in the decision was all information submitted to the Court and 
the Board regarding your case including police investigation reports, presentence 
reports etc., all information in your file was disclosed to you as acknowlegded by your 
signature of May 27,1998. 
The Matrix and guidelines is a tool that "suggest" the amount of time a person could 
serve. The Courts and the Board are not bound to follow the guidelines, as noted 
before, It te vised pnly q? q gwfeline. 
The Board can consider recommendations from other agencies such as the courts 
and the prison, however it is not bound to follow their recommendations. 
In the rational for a decision, the Board determined " a weapon was used in the 
commitment of the crime", It's not saying you used the weapon. It has been 
acknowledged you were not the person who actually used the weapon, however the 
Sentencing Court determined you were equally guilty of the crime. 
As for the misdeaminor offense of Contempt it was not configured in the matrix. The 
only cime included was Murder,a First Degree Felony. 
Regarding your request for an inmmediate hearing or review, the Board will not 
consider any change to a Board ordered parole, review,rehearing date or conditions 
of parole without the express request from an assigned Case Worker, Case Manager, 
Treatment Team, Institutional Parole Officer or Parole Officer,etc. You should 
communicate with the appropiate channels at the institution. 
Sincere] 
scobar 
He<fring Officer 
Exhibit H 
Order of The Honorable Judge L. A. Dever 
SHAREL S. REBER (#7966) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O. Box 140857 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVIS EDWARD TELFORD, ORDER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF PARDONS, Case No. 000900955 
Respondent. Judge L.A. DEVER 
Having carefully reviewed all the pleadings submitted by both parities, being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, and based on the following: 
1. Pursuant to prevailing Utah law, "the [Utah Board of Pardons and Parole's] 
exercise of its parole powers in setting determinate parole dates does not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine." Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 
947 P.2d 664,669 (Utah 1997). 
2. The Board's imposition of a parole date in excess of the state's sentencing 
guidelines does not violate substantive nor procedural due process rights, "[S]o 
long as the period of incarceration decided by the Board of Pardons falls within an 
inmate's applicable indeterminate range, then absent unusual circumstances, that 
decision cannot be arbitrary or capricious-" Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508,512 
(Utah 1994). 
3. The Board has a right <4to rely on any factors known . . . or later adduced . . . in 
deciding whether [a prospective probationer] pose[s] a societal risk Northern 
v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696,699 (Utah App. 1992) <#V/870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993). 
4. Moreover, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77 -27-5(3), "[d]ecisions of the Board of 
Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or termination of 
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not 
subject to judicial review." 
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) has not exceeded the scope of its 
authority by setting Petitioner's parole date in the year 2018. The Board's 
imposition of this date does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, nor 
does it violate Petitioner's substantive or procedural due process rights, where, as 
here, this date falls within the applicable range of incarceration for the crime 
2 
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced. 
The Board's consideration of Petitioner's unwillingness to testify at his co-
defendant's trial as a factor in determining Petitioner's parole date, is not subject 
to judicial review. 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted, dismissing Petitioner's Petition with 
prejudice. 
DATED this day of September 2000. 
L.A. DEVER 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid, 
on this r day of September 2000 to the following: 
Travis E. Telford 
Inmate #23999 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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